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hy have so few jobs been created in the United States in 
the past four years? As Richard B. Freeman and William 
M. Rodgers III document, this has been the weakest recovery 
from a U.S. recession in the past forty years—employment 
creation in the 2001-04 period has fallen short of job growth in 
the recovery phase of all of the last six U.S. recessions—by a 
substantial margin. The basic question the authors ask is: why? 
For Americans, the answer is important because, as 
Freeman and Rodgers state: “As long as the United States 
makes full employment its main ‘welfare state’ protection for 
workers, the country has to attain something akin to the late 
1990s tightness in the labor market for economic growth to be 
shared among the entire population.” With a system of 
unemployment insurance that offers very low benefits 
compared with those of European nations and very limited 
access to social assistance, unemployed Americans face 
financial hardship much faster than the unemployed 
elsewhere—with the added burden that insurance for health 
care costs is often lost as a by-product of job loss. There is also 
the added wrinkle that the lifetime limit on social assistance 
benefits written into the Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families reforms of 1996 was not generally a binding constraint 
until 2001—but it is now increasingly relevant to more people.
For the rest of the world, the answer is important because 
the United States seems to have already fired most of its 
available macroeconomic ammunition—in monetary, fiscal, 
and exchange rate policy—to disappointingly limited effect in 
terms of jobs. Starting in December 2000, the Federal Reserve 
cut the federal funds target rate from 6 percent to a forty-year 
low of 1 percent by mid-2003. Tax cuts, temporary investment 
incentives, and a rapid increase in government outlays shifted 
the structural fiscal balance by some 5 percentage points of 
GDP after 2001. Between 2001 and 2004, the U.S. dollar’s real 
effective exchange rate depreciated approximately 25 percent. 
It is hard to imagine how macroeconomic stimulus could have 
been more stimulative—but job creation has lagged badly 
while the current account deficit has surged to just under 
6 percent of GDP. Hence, when even the International 
Monetary Fund has gone public with its concerns about the 
mounting dangers to global financial stability if present trends 
are not reversed,1 non-Americans have reason to be concerned 
about the types of pressures for policy changes that might 
emerge if job creation does not become much more robust 
relatively quickly.
For the United States in 2004, the question “Why has job 
creation in this recovery been so weak?” can therefore be 
decomposed into the twin questions “With this much policy 
stimulus, why hasn’t there been more GDP growth?” and “Why 
has some recovery in GDP growth produced so little growth in 
employment?” Freeman and Rodgers focus mostly on the 
second question, although they do note that a budget deficit 
inflated by tax cuts tilted toward the very rich, with their 
relatively low marginal propensity to consume, will tend to 
provide an ineffective stimulus to aggregate demand. (One 
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could add the fact that hi-tech foreign wars may be very 
expensive financially, but they provide little domestic U.S. job 
creation.) Freeman and Rodgers rightly reject the argument 
that rapid productivity growth should take the blame for slow 
job creation, emphasizing that productivity improvements 
increase the noninflationary growth rate of potential GDP. 
Their examination of measures of consumer confidence does 
not suggest that greater uncertainty has produced a change in 
consumer sentiment that has depressed consumer demand. 
Hence, because the authors do not argue for additional fiscal or 
monetary stimulus to aggregate demand, and they do not 
suggest any tendency to reduced labour supply, they must look 
primarily for “structural” explanations.
Much of the paper is therefore devoted to charting the 
distribution of employment and wage changes, by 
demographic group and education category, as a possible 
source of clues to an explanation for the current weakness of 
the GDP-jobs link. No “smoking gun” emerges. “Off-shoring” 
of jobs has been highly visible in the media, but this is really a 
long-run trend. In recent years, the impact may have shifted 
collar color somewhat, from blue to white; but to explain the 
difference in total job creation between 2001-04 and the 
recovery from previous recessions, one needs a very large 
acceleration from trend, for which there is little evidence.
Similarly, by financing most medical costs through health 
insurance premiums as a fringe benefit of employment, the 
United States has chosen a system that creates a substantial 
fixed cost to firms in terms of new hires and thereby provides 
an incentive to employers to ask for longer weekly work hours, 
instead of hiring new workers, when product demand recovers. 
This has always been a U.S. problem—but there is no recent 
institutional change to explain why this recovery is different. 
Freeman and Rodgers suggest that rising health costs may have 
recently tipped the balance, and if so, this will imply greater 
labour market inflexibility—that is, of firms—in future years 
in the United States than in other Organisation for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development (OECD) nations. But this 
remains a conjecture.
A final possible explanation is offered by accelerating 
structural change. Some structural trends should have 
produced a faster rebound in jobs in this recession than in 
previous times—such as the much greater use of the Internet in 
job searches in recent years2—because faster job finding should 
have resulted in greater employment at any given time. 
However, the crucial characteristic distinguishing 
unemployment due to structural change from “cyclical” or 
“demand deficient” unemployment is the fact that “structural 
unemployment” occurs when workers are unable to fill 
available jobs because they lack the required skills or do not live 
where jobs are available. This implies that the number of 
vacancies is an upper bound to the extent of structural 
unemployment. Since there is little evidence for a recent 
increase in the number of unfilled vacancies in the United 
States, the case for a recent increase in structural 
unemployment mismatch seems somewhat dubious.
In addition, appealing to structural change to explain recent 
job-creation trends leads naturally to the question “What’s 
different about U.S. structural change?” Other countries also 
have the Internet, advanced computer technologies, and other 
innovations, and a defining characteristic of “globalisation” is 
an acceleration of the rate of international diffusion of 
innovations. If structural change is causing anaemic job growth 
in the United States, one should see signs of similarly slow job 
creation elsewhere—but one does not. Between December 
2000 and December 2004, total nonfarm employment in the 
United States barely moved—indeed, it fell by 0.08 percent, 
from 133,308,000 to 133,200,000.3 By comparison, Canada, 
arguably the country most institutionally similar to the United 
States, saw a 7.3 percent increase in employment over the same 
period.4
Job creation in the United States now lags job creation in 
several other countries (see chart). By 2003, the employment-
population ratio in the United States—particularly for men—
was not much different than the ratio in many other OECD 
nations. There is more variation across countries in female 
than in male employment, and the combination of earlier 
retirement and higher unemployment has depressed the 
employment rates of French, German, and Italian men. 
However, Japan and the Netherlands had higher—and Canada 
and Australia had only marginally lower—male employment 
rates than the United States did in 2003.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / August 2005 21
These other nations also have more social supports available 
for the jobless—in the form of income transfers, health care 
provision, and public services—than the United States does. 
The problem therefore is that a nation with an above-average 
dependency on healthy job growth is now generating only an 
average level of employment. One suspects that this is not 
going to be perceived as “good enough,” and that it will not be 
long before a cruel choice will be made between better job 
creation and macroeconomic stability in government debt and 
inflation. Endnotes
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1. See International Monetary Fund (2004).
2. See Kuhn and Skuterud (2004).
3. See <ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/suppl/empsit.compaeu.txt>.
4. Employment rose from 14,974,500 in December 2000 to 16,098,800 
in December 2004 (see Canism II Series V2064890).
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